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A NARROWING VIEW: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AND BAE
By
Alexander Park*

I.  

INTRODUCTION

In United States ex. rel Paige v. BAE Sys. Tech. the Sixth Circuit held that an
arbitration agreement, which was limited to disputes arising out of an employment
contract, did not reach an action brought under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).1 The
Sixth Circuit found that were no grounds for compelling arbitration because the FCA
retaliation claim was brought under a statute. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit narrowly
construed the arbitration clause, which compelled arbitration for disputes “arising from
this Agreement” and not for disputes relating to the agreement or employment generally.2
With this decision the Sixth Circuit continued to muddy what exactly is needed to prove
that parties originally intended to arbitrate a given issue and suggested that deference to
arbitrability may be lesser than it was before. In this the Court is certainly not alone,
though BAE appears to emphasize starkly contrasting views on the ease of proving
arbitrability regarding statutorily based actions.
II.  

BACKGROUND FACTS

Matt Paige and Jim Gammon (“Relators”) filed a qui tam action against BAE
Systems Technology Solutions & Services, Inc. (“BAE”) claiming that BAE violated the
fraud and retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act.3 Relators were employees of
MTC Technologies, Inc. (“MTC”), which was purchased by BAE in 2008.4 As a result
of their new employment with BAE, Relators were required to sign an employment
agreement, which contained an arbitration clause that required arbitration of any disputes
“arising from this Agreement.”5 BAE provided a laundry list of services to the United
States Department of Defense and various other federal agencies.6 Throughout Relators
*
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time with BAE, they noticed possibly fraudulent activities, including the alleged use of
insider information to illegally improve BAE’s chances of obtaining government
contracts and the alleged falsification of time sheets to fraudulently obtain money from
their federal contracts.7 Concerned with the improprieties they were witnessing, Relators
“blew the whistle” on BAE and informed the appropriate United States authorities of the
apparent fraudulent activity.8
After cooperating with those investigating the charges, Matt Paige was placed on
administrative leave and allegedly had a reduction in responsibilities, had a transfer
denied, and was subsequently reassigned.9 Paige alleged that these conditions
constructively forced him to quit.10 Additionally, Jim Gammon, was passed over for
promotion and later laid off with a number of others.11 These actions prompted Relators
to file a qui tam complaint in the United States District Court Eastern District of
Michigan in 2009.12 A number of extensions were requested by the United States to
allow time for further investigation which resulted in the matter stretching into 2013
before the District Court issued any ruling on the matter.13
This ruling was issued as a result of BAE’s Motion to Dismiss on February 22,
2013, which attempted to dismiss the matter pending its submission to arbitration.14 BAE
pointed to the arbitration clause of the agreement, and argued that it bound the parties to
arbitrate the retaliation claim.15 Focusing on the issues pertaining to the arbitration clause,
BAE referenced a plethora of cases that supported its argument that FCA retaliation
claims were arbitrable because all federal statutory claims are arbitrable.16 Further, BAE
pointed to a plethora of cases from other courts finding that FCA claims do not lack
6
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arbitrability, and arbitrating such claims generally forwarded the federal policy favoring
of arbitration.17
The relevant portion of the arbitration clause reads:
Employer hereby agrees that any dispute arising from this Agreement,
which cannot be resolved through normal practices and procedures of the
Company, shall be resolved through a mediation/arbitration approach.
The Employee agrees to elect, with the Company, a mutually agreeable,
neutral third party to help mediate any dispute, which arises under the
terms of this Agreement.18
Focusing on the precise wording of the clause, Relators argued that the retaliation claims
fell outside the entirety of the agreement.19 Instead of arguing that the arbitration clause
was invalid or unconscionable, Relators focused the contrasting breadth of arbitration
clauses involved all other cases, which typically covered any dispute or controversy.20
After reviewing the filings, the District Court granted BAE’s motion to dismiss,
dismissed Relators’ fraud claims with prejudice, and dismissed Relators’ retaliation claim
in favor of arbitration.21 In evaluating the Relators’ arguments, the District Court relied
on Simon v. Pfizer Inc. and Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., and held that unless there was a
specific exclusion within the arbitration clause than it would be interpreted as broadly as
possible.22 Understandably unsatisfied with the result, Relators appealed only the
dismissal of their retaliation claim in favor of arbitration.23
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III.  

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
A.  

Arbitration Agreements Should Be Limited to Their Express Scope

The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by reflecting upon the fact that the first step
in this process is determining the existence of an arbitration agreement.24 No dispute as to
the existence of an arbitration clause existed in the case, and consequently the Sixth
Circuit quickly moved on to say that the only question to be decided is whether the FCA
retaliation claim is covered under the scope of the agreement and proceeds into a de novo
review.25
In determining the scope of an arbitration agreement, the Court noted that all
issues of arbitrability should be resolved by giving preference to arbitration.26 It then
narrowed this policy by providing a series of quotations from Sixth Circuit precedent that
describe in great detail how no federal preference for arbitration can force arbitration into
a dispute where no agreement existed, and that all arbitration agreements should be
enforced just as any other private contract.27 Admitting that any ambiguities should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, the Court cited itself in saying “we do not override the
clear intent of the parties, or reach a result inconsistent with the plain text of the
contract.”28 The Sixth Circuit stated that the proper method to determine the scope of an
arbitration agreement is to examine the plain language of the agreement and to limit the
clause to only the explicit areas which it purports to cover.29
Utilizing this framework, the Court referred back to the term “dispute” as it is
utilized in the agreement at issue.30 Under its analysis, every instance of “dispute” within
the agreement referred to a dispute arising explicitly under the terms and conditions of
the employment agreement and no further.31 With this understanding of the clause, the
Court concluded that the FCA retaliation claim did not arise under the terms of the
24
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Ltd., 512 F.3d 807, 812 (6 th Cir. 2008)).
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2010)).
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agreement.32 Restating the entire relevant portion of the FCA, the Court found that the
FCA claim was not arbitrable because it could exist independent of the employment
agreement.33 As a result of this determination, the Sixth Circuit found that the arbitration
agreement did not restrict Relators from proceeding to court.34
B.
The Narrowly Crafted Agreement in this Case is Substantially Narrower
than Agreements Seen in Other Comparable Cases.
Drawing direct comparisons between the disputed clause and the related
arbitration agreements in previous cases, the Court emphasized how other similar
agreements included broader language—such as requiring arbitration in all matters
“related to” a contract or in “all issues having a bearing” on potential disputes.35 This
distinction was key, as the Sixth Circuit certainly seemed to infer that the issue in this
matter was an oversight on the part of the drafters of the contract, which rendered
statutory claims outside the scope of the agreed upon arbitration.36
Along those same lines, the Sixth Circuit made clear that the disputed involved
contract construction rather than arbitration policy.37 They noted taking BAE’s stance
that all disputes related to employment are by their very nature arising out of an
employment agreement, and therefore binding all such disputes to arbitration, would be
similar to creating a contract the original parties never agreed to.38 The fine line of
arbitrability drawn by the Sixth Circuit ultimately lead the Court to reverse and remand
the retaliation claim for further proceedings.39
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE

BAE evidences a continuing, and admitted, trend of Sixth Circuit precedent that
interprets arbitration clauses as narrowly as possible, especially where the matter at hand

32

BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 566 F. App’x at 503.
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involves a statutory claim.40 In 2011, the Sixth Circuit found in Turi v. Main Street
Adoption Services, LLP that an arbitration agreement did not cover a RICO claim due, in
part, to the fact that it was based entirely on statute and not on contract.41 Additionally,
the Turi Court noted that the arbitration clause appeared to be limited to disputes
“regarding fees” and not “any and all disputes.”42 The Sixth Circuit drew this same
interpretive distinction to formulate their ruling in BAE.43 The Sixth Circuit again
explicitly took a strict approach to interpreting arbitration agreements in Simon v. Pfizer,
Inc.44 There, the Sixth Circuit held an arbitration agreement limited to “disputes
concerning both Constructive Termination and Termination for Just cause” did not cover
retaliation claims brought under ERISA § 510.45
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has demonstrated that it is more than willing to follow
the federal policy in favor of arbitration when it believes that an arbitral clause is broadly
constructed and has done so as recently as January 2014.46 When an arbitral clause is
written in a fashion that is in any way non-inclusive, however, the Sixth Circuit is more
than willing to depart from federal policy and strictly interpret the arbitration clause at
issue.47
Though there are no directly analogous cases to BAE from other federal courts,
other jurisdictions have been far more stringent in narrowing the scope of a clause than
the one before the Sixth Circuit in BAE. For instance, the Seventh Circuit narrowly
construed an arbitration clause because the clause only stated that arbitration would cover
“invoice amounts” and not claims “arising out of” invoice disputes.48 Presumably, had
those three words been added the clause in Welborn would have been broadly construed
by the Seventh Circuit. Further, the Tenth Circuit has found that a clause that covered
“all controversies” in one matter explicitly barred arbitration of other disputes was
40

See, e.g., Turi v. Main St. Adoption Servs., LLP., 633 F.3d 496, 510-11 (6 th Cir. 2011); Simon v. Pfizer,
Inc., 398 F.3d 765, 775 (6 th Cir. 2005).
41

Turi, 633 F.3d at 510-11.
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Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 627 (6 th Cir. 2004) (“Where, as here, the arbitration
clause is broad…” only express exclusions can limit arbitration); Pureworks, Inc. v. Unique Software
Solutions, Inc., 554 Fed. App’x. 376 (6 th Cir. 2014) (finding that even though Pureworks asserted the
arbitration clauses were meant to be narrow the plain text of the contract seemed to include all related
disputes over a balance sheet).
47

See supra note 43.
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Welborn Clinic v. Medquist, Inc., 301 F.3d 634, 640 (7 th Cir. 2002) (“If the parties intended to arbitrate
all claims “related to” or even “arising out of” invoice disputes, then why not simply say that?”)
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narrow because the clause included an express limitation on disputes that could be
submitted to arbitration.49 In BAE there was no express limitation of arbitrability, only
what the Sixth Circuit deemed an implied limitation.50 Finally, in perhaps the most
striking contrast to the Sixth Circuit in BAE, the Fifth Circuit found that a plaintiff
asserting sexual harassment and retaliation claims was bound by a “broad” arbitration
agreement that stated, “…any action contesting the validity of this Agreement, the
enforcement of its financial terms, or other disputes shall be submitted to arbitration…”51
Whereas the Sixth Circuit found that the mere mention of the terms of the agreement
narrowed the scope, the Fifth Circuit held that just by including the phrase “other
disputes” that the agreement was undoubtedly broad enough to submit the statutory
claims at issue to arbitration.52 The list of courts that tend to broadly interpret arbitration
clauses seems to outnumber the Sixth significantly, including not only those mentioned
previously but the Eighth and Fourth Circuits as well.53
BAE is particularly significant because it would appear to evidence an anomaly in
the federal court system. In the Sixth Circuit, if an arbitration agreement is crafted in any
fashion, which fails to incorporate all-inclusive terms, then the practitioner must exhibit
caution. While BAE stands at odds with decisions in other federal circuits, its holding is
clearly not an outlier in the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence. Rather, it is a continuation of
the Court’s narrow interpretation of the scope of arbitration agreements. Further
evidencing the Sixth Circuit’s internal consistency with this ideal, the Sixth Circuit ruled
that a clause that stated “any and all controversies or claims arising out of, or relating to”
the employee handbook was narrow and barred arbitration of a civil rights claim because
the handbook had not been entered into the record.54

49

Chelsea Family Pharm., PLLC v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 567 F.3d 1191, 1193-1194 (10 th Circ.
2009) (“Such an explicit limitation of scope is analytically equivalent to an express exclusion of other
issues”).
50

BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 566 F. App’x at 502 (clause contained no express limitation
only an arguably implicit limitation by covering “any dispute, which arises under the terms of this
Agreement”).
51

Rojasv. TK Communs., 87 F.3d 745, 746 (5 th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (holding that because the
arbitration was sufficiently broad it could encompass the relevant claims, and therefore inferring if it had
been more narrow such claims may fall outside the scope of the agreement). Check highlighted term for
correct abbreviation.
52

Id. at 747 (“…we conclude that the district court was correct when it found that “any other disputes” was
sufficiently broad to encompass Rojas’ Title VII claims.”)
53

3m Co. v. Amtex Sec., Inc., 542 F.3d 1193 (8 th Cir. 2008) (finding in their analysis that an arbitration
clause limited to three distinct contractual issues was broad); American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized
Thermal Imaging, 96 F.3d 88 (4 th Cir. 1996) (holding that the arbitration agreement’s language covering
disputes that “arose out of or related to” an agreement was a broad enough provision to cover claims related
to the contract even if the specific terms of the agreement were not implicated).
54

Kay v. Minacs Group (USA), Inc., 580 F. App’x 327 (6th Cir. 2014).
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In essence, the key to understanding and utilizing BAE in the future is that
drafting a “broad” arbitration clause in the Sixth Circuit requires explicitly inclusive
language to be included in an arbitration agreement. To err on the side of caution, a
prudent practitioner would use the phrases “arising out of” and “related to,” but should
add specific wording adding that the agreement is meant cover “any and all disputes”
between the parties arising out of state or federal law. Though seemingly redundant in
other jurisdictions, the assurance that statutory claims will not fall outside of the scope of
the agreement would be a significant burden off the mind of drafters in the Sixth Circuit.
V.

CRITIQUE

In reversing the District Court’s holding, the Sixth Circuit may have been
internally consistent, but further evidenced their departure from the federal policy
favoring arbitration applied by other courts. Resultantly, the Sixth Circuit has partially
undermined the stability and surety that usually accompanies arbitration. Practitioners
are now left to wonder if “standard” arbitration clauses will fall victim to a narrow
interpretation by the Sixth Circuit should disputes be adjudicated in the jurisdiction.
The District Court, using the same precedent as the Sixth Circuit, came to the
conclusion that an arbitration clause which would cover “any dispute” arising out of the
contract should be considered broad.55 Considering the initial contracts were signed by
Relators and BAE it can be presumed that they agreed to arbitration, and that given the
wording of the agreement it could certainly be argued that the parties intended to arbitrate
anything related to their employment with the company.
Indeed, no stretch of the imagination is required to believe that submitting any
and all claims by its employees was a motivating factor for BAE to draft its Employment
Agreements in the manner it did. While it is certainly not illogical to require a strict
interpretation of contractual provisions, where the only significant drafting oversight in a
disputed agreement appears to be the omission of “or related to your employment,” it
would seem that the intent of the parties should be readily inferable.56
The larger issue with the Sixth Circuits decision appears to be that even if the
arbitration clause had been constructed with greater precision, the Court still could have
conceivably overlooked the language and justified its decision by the fact that the FCA
claims is a statutory claim that existed independent of the parties’ agreement.57 This is
evidenced by the technicalities on which the Sixth Circuit relies upon to support its
ruling.58 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s focus on whether the retaliation claim arose
55

BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc.,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188644, at *2-3 (quoting Simon, 398
F.3d 765, 775).
56

But see Welborn, 301 F.3d 634, 640 (“If the parties intended to arbitrate all claims “related to” or even
“arising out of” invoice disputes, then why not simply say that?”)
57

BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 566 F. App’x at 503.
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Id. (limited the term “dispute” because the agreement only refers to disputes regarding terms of the
agreement, despite the fact that the natural reading of the clause would be significantly broader).
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specifically under the terms of the agreement ignores the simple fact that the retaliation
claim could not exist unless Relators were indeed employed.59 Certainly the argument
can be made that the supposedly strict wording of the arbitration clause gave credence to
the Court’s uncompromisingly textual approach. Upon closer examination, however, the
arbitration clause itself appears to call for a broader interpretation.60 In fact, the first
portion of the clause states that it shall pertain to all “arising from this Agreement,” a
fairly commonplace phrase used in many arbitration agreements.61 Arguably, it is only
by ignoring this introductory language and claiming the later portion of the clause limited
the preceding language that the Sixth Circuit was able to prevent the arbitration
agreement from reaching this statutory action.62
More importantly, even if the drafter utilized the standard arbitration clause
approved by the American Arbitration Association, there would still be questions as to
whether the Sixth Circuit, post-BAE, would find an arbitration agreement to be “broad.”
Said AAA standard arbitration agreement reads:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the
American Arbitration Association in accordance with its Commercial [or
other] Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the
arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.63
While AAA standard agreement is certainly a more general agreement than the
agreement in BAE, it would not be unrealistic for the Sixth Circuit to state that an FCA
claim neither “arose out of” nor was “related to” an employment contract, and therefore
hold the claim fell outside the express intent of the parties when the contract was
signed.64 If the specific terms of employment are wholly separate from any FCA claim,
then an FCA claim could not be “related to” an employment contract more generally.
The Sixth Circuit impliedly endorsed this view when it stated that an FCA retaliation
claim is “completely separate from the contract and asserts an independent claim that
would exist even without the contract.”65 This interpretation could just as readily apply if
BAE had used the AAA standard arbitration agreement, and therefore seems prone to
59

BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 566 F. App’x at 503, 504.

60

See BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188644 (interpreting the agreement
in question as broad).
61

BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 566 F. App’x at 502.

62

Id. at 503.

63

American Arbitration Association, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses: A Practical Guide (Sept. 25,
2014 5:00 PM).
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BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 566 F. App’x at 503.
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cause confusion as to what is considered broad and what is considered narrow. Certainly
FCA retaliation claims are arbitrable, but the Sixth Circuit’s narrowing of a seemingly
broad arbitration agreement makes it more difficult to predict whether or not a clause.66
Ultimately, a stricter view of arbitration clauses partially subverts the intent of the
parties that signed the arbitration agreement; to adjudicate disputes through means other
than the judiciary. The Sixth Circuit may believe that it would be creating a contract
from nothing if it were to read past the explicit terms of the arbitration clause, but in
reality it would likely maintain the spirit of the initial contract.67
Perhaps Relators refusal to arbitrate evidences that they never intended to agree to
arbitrate statutory claims in the first place. More likely, however, was that Relators were
willing to submit to arbitration in all instances in order to obtain gainful employment, and
then perceived a weakness in the clause mid-litigation and proceeded accordingly.
Considering that there appears to be some consensus regarding the arbitrability of
FCA and other statutory claims, it is rather perplexing that four or five words stand
between BAE and adjudicatory efficiency.68 On a purely practical level that retaliation
claims, which directly pertain to the termination of employment, are somehow
completely removed from the employment agreement itself, defies even a simple
understanding of the FCA.69 Therefore, liberal federal policy favoring arbitration would
seem to run contrary to the path that the Sixth Circuit treads.
The approach taken by the District Court appeared to more appropriate.70 Even
without the more precise wording of a more finely crafted arbitration clause, it would
appear that any and all disputes relating to the agreement or employment generally would
be arbitrable.71 Such an interpretation of the disputed clause not only supports the federal
policy favoring arbitration, but also provides clarity concerning the scope of similarly
drafted instruments. Using the Sixth Circuit’s rationale, any amount of statutory claims
could slip through the cracks of otherwise stable and “broad” arbitration agreements in
the name of preserving the intent of the parties. The reality is, however, that when an
arbitration agreement is drafted, there is no evidence that either party considered or
wished for statutory claims of any sort to be precluded from arbitration. Thus, in its
attempt to preserve the intent of the parties, the Sixth Circuit instead placed a stumbling
block in the path of arbitrability determinations.

66

See United States ex rel. Cassaday v. KBR, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 850 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that
nothing precludes FCA claims from being arbitrable and appropriately drafted arbitration agreements may
compel arbitration in FCA matters).
67

BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 566 F. App’x at 504.

68

KBR, 590 F. Supp. 2d 850.

69

BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 566 F. App’x at 503.
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BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188644 (finding that the qui tam action
was covered under the “any dispute arising out of this agreement” language).
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Id.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

BAE provides a substantial examination of contemporary views on the scope of
arbitration clauses. Though certainly this comment does not wish to indicate that the
Sixth Circuit is somehow hostile to arbitration, it would be accurate to state that the Sixth
Circuit views arbitral clauses with caution. Using BAE as a reminder of how to
determine the breadth of arbitration clauses, practitioners should proceed in drafting their
agreements with great caution. Arbitration agreements are only safe in the Sixth Circuit
if they include references to any and all disputes between the parties.
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